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Abstract
Argumentation schemes can be described as abstract structures representing
the most generic types of argument, constituting the building blocks of the ones
used in everyday reasoning. This paper investigates the structure, classification,
and uses of such schemes. Three goals are pursued: 1) to describe the schemes,
showing how they evolved and how they have been classified in the traditional
and the modern theories; 2) to propose a method for classifying them based on
ancient and modern developments; and 3) to outline and show how schemes can
be used to describe and analyze or produce real arguments. To this purpose, we
will build on the traditional distinctions for building a dichotomic classification
of schemes, and we will advance a modular approach to argument analysis,
in which different argumentation schemes are combined together in order to
represent each step of reasoning on which a complex argument relies. Finally,
we will show how schemes are applied to formal systems, focusing on their
applications to Artificial Intelligence, AI & Law, argument mining, and formal
ontologies.
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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is threefold: 1) to describe the schemes, showing how
they evolved and how they have been classified in the traditional and the modern
theories; 2) to propose a method for classifying them based on ancient and modern
developments; and 3) to outline and show how schemes are interrelated and can
be organized in a modular way to describe natural arguments or produce complex
arguments. Historically, the schemes evolved from the Aristotelian topics, the so-
called places to find arguments. But looking over the descriptions Aristotle presented
of them in the Topics, for the most part they do not appear to very much resemble
the argumentation schemes in the contemporary list of Walton, Reed and Macagno
[Walton et al., 2008]. Of course there are exceptions, such as the topic for argument
from analogy described in Aristotle, which is recognizable as standing for the same
kind of argument as the current scheme for argument from analogy, even though the
detailed description of it is quite different.
Argumentation schemes are instruments for argumentation, involving the activ-
ity of critically evaluating a viewpoint and the reasons given in its support. For this
reason, every scheme has a corresponding set of critical questions, representing its
defeasibility conditions and the possible weak points that the interlocutor can use
to question the argument and evaluate its strength. A critic who has no counter-
arguments ready to hand can search through the list of critical questions matching
the argument he is confronted with in order to look for clues on how the argument
can be attacked that might suggest sources of evidence that could be used to build
up a whole line of argumentation that furnishes a way of refuting the argument.
The fundamental challenge that a theory of argumentation schemes needs to
face is the problem of finding a useful and sound classification system. The schemes
need to be usable, easily identifiable, and at the same time they need to allow
the user to detect the most specific pattern of argument that can fit the text or
that can be employed for producing an argument suitable to the circumstances
and the purpose. In any classification system, entities can be classified in many
different ways, depending on the purpose of the classification. The purpose of the
classification system will determine the criteria for classification that are adopted in
that system. For example, a much more detailed classification of animals may be
useful in biology than the kind of classification that might be useful for law, or for
classifying animals as they are spoken and written about in everyday conversational
English. We need to begin by specifying the purpose of the classification, so that
some guidance can be given on how to identify the criteria used in the classification
system. From this perspective it is useful to examine how the study of argumentation
schemes evolved.
Argumentation Schemes
2 Introducing argumentation schemes
Argumentation schemes represent forms of argument that are widely used in every-
day conversational argumentation, and in other contexts such as legal and scientific
argumentation. But for the most part these arguments are not adequately modeled
by deductive forms of reasoning of the kind familiar in classical logic or as statistical
inferences based on the standard Bayesian account of probability. They represent
the premise-conclusion structure of an argument, and they are defeasible. Their de-
feasibility conditions are shown as a set of critical questions, dialectical instruments
to help begin the procedure of testing the strength and acceptability of an argument
by weighing the pro and con arguments.
2.1 Nature of the schemes
Argumentation schemes are stereotypical patterns of inference, combining semantic-
ontological relations with types of reasoning and logical axioms and representing
the abstract structure of the most common types of natural arguments [Macagno
and Walton, 2015]. The argumentation schemes provided in [Walton et al., 2008]
describe the patterns of the most typical arguments, without drawing distinctions
between material relations (namely relations between concepts expressed by the war-
rant of an argument), types of reasoning (such as induction, deduction, abduction),
and logical rules of inference characterizing the various types of reasoning (such as
modus ponens, modus tollens, etc.). For this reason, argumentation schemes fall into
distinct patterns of reasoning such as abductive, analogical, or inductive ones, and
ones from classification or cause to effect.
In order to design a system for classifying the schemes, it is useful to understand
their limits, and investigate how the dimensions of an argument (material relation
and logical form) are merged. For example, consider argument from cause to effect
[Walton et al., 2008, p.328]:
Major premise Generally, if A occurs, then B will (might) occur.
Minor premise In this case, A occurs (might occur).
Conclusion Therefore, in this case B will (might) occur).
Table 1: Argument from cause to effect
This argumentation scheme is based on a defeasible modus ponens scheme [Ver-
heij, 2003a] which is combined with a semantic causal relation between two events.
The material (semantic) relation is merged with the logical one. However, this com-
bination represents only one of the possible types of inferences that can be drawn
Macagno, Walton and Reed
from the same semantic-ontological connection. The actual relationship between the
material and the logical relation is much more complex. For example, consider the
classic Aristotelian causal link between “having fever” and “breathing fast,” and see
how this cause-effect relation can be used to draw a conclusion based on different
logical rules [Macagno and Walton, 2015; Macagno, 2015])
1. He had fever. (Fever causes breathing fast). Therefore, he (must have)
breathed fast.
2. He did not breathe fast. (Fever causes breathing fast). Therefore, he had no
fever.
3. He is breathing fast. (Fever causes breathing fast). Therefore, he might have
fever.
4. He has no fever. (Fever causes breathing fast). Therefore, he may be not
breathing fast.
5. You may have fever. When I had fever, I was breathing fast, and you are
breathing fast.
Cases (1) and (2) proceed logically from defeasible deductive axioms, i.e. the
defeasible modus ponens (in 1), and the defeasible modus tollens (in 2). Cases 3 and
4 proceed from abductive reasoning. In (3) the conclusion is drawn by affirming the
consequent, while in (4) the denial of the antecedent can be rephrased by contrapo-
sition as “not breathing fast is caused by having no fever,” leading to a conclusion
drawn abductively [Walton et al., 2008, pp.169–173]. In (5) the conclusion is based
on an inductive generalization from one single case.
Schemes represent only the prototypical matching between semantic relations
and logical rules (types of reasoning and axioms). This matching is, however, only
the most common one. The material and the logical relations can combine in several
different ways. Hence this distinction needs to be taken into account order to classify
the schemes.
2.2 Why schemes are important
Critics often ask how these schemes can be justified, given that they resisted analysis
as deductive or inductive forms of argument of the kind recognized as valid in the
dominant 20th-century logic tradition [Walton and Sartor, 2013].
Schemes are becoming extremely important for practical reasons. First, argu-
mentation schemes are instruments for analyzing and recognizing natural arguments
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occurring in ordinary and specialized discourse. For example, arguments from polit-
ical discourse have been analyzed using the schemes, and the argumentative profiles
of the candidates have been brought to light considering their preferences of the
types of arguments used [Hansen & Walton, 2013]. Thousands of real examples of
these forms of argument have been analyzed in the argumentation literature, such as
the considerable literature on fallacies, with the aid of tools like argument mapping
[Reed et al., 2007; Rowe et al., 2006]. On this basis, the structure, use, and im-
portance of schemes for argumentation studies have been justified inductively. This
method consists in the following steps:
1. The structure of a scheme is outlined considering the literature on the topic.
2. A significant mass of examples of arguments is analyzed using the scheme,
adapting and modifying the scheme so that it can best describe the specific
natural arguments.
3. It is shown that the form of argument represented by the scheme under analysis
is significantly important for the study of argumentation as it occurs in natural
language discourse (and other specialized contexts such as legal discourse).
4. Empirical justification is given that this form of argument needs to be recog-
nized as a basic scheme for argumentation.
Second, schemes are instruments that can be used for the purpose of teaching critical
thinking. Informal logic is a field is known for having grown from its origins in
textbooks that departed from formal logic and instead proceeded on the basis of
analyzing numerous examples of arguments from ordinary discourse, such as those
taken from magazines and newspapers. There is an abundance of such textbooks full
of examples of everyday arguments related to topics such as the informal fallacy of
appeal to authority, false cause, and so forth. During its growth stage and subsequent
theoretical flowering, the field followed this trend by stressing the importance of
analyzing real arguments “on the hoof”. For example, the handbook Informal Logic
[Walton, 1989] was based on hundred 150 key examples, many of them illustrating
forms of argument now identified with argumentation schemes, including personal
attack, uses and abuses of expert opinion, arguments from analogy, arguments from
correlation to cause, and so forth. These textbooks and continued academic writings
on informal logic contained a very large number of such examples, often analyzed
in minute detail. Argumentation schemes, such as argument from expert opinion,
are tested against the real examples, to discuss the respects in which the abstract
scheme fits or does not fit the vagaries of the real-life example. This body of data
confirms that certain types of arguments, mainly the ones subsequently identified
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as argumentation schemes, are not only extremely common, but are also highly
influential in daily practices of argumentation.
Third, schemes can be used in education both for teaching students how to ar-
gue and for learning through argumentation [Erduran and Jimenez-Aleixandre, 2007;
Erduran and Jiménez Aleixandre, 2012; Rapanta and Walton, 2016]. The interest
in argumentation and the patterns for representing natural arguments is growing
[Rapanta et al., 2013]. The argumentation schemes illustrated in [Walton, 1995;
Walton et al., 2008] have been applied to science education in order to represent
students’ arguments and improve the quality thereof [Rapanta and Macagno, 2016],
retrieve the implicit premises, and assess and rebut their reasoning in a systematic
fashion [Macagno and Konstantinidou, 2013], or to assess the quality of argumen-
tation [Duschl et al., 1999; Ozdem et al., 2013]. However, a crucial problem arising
out of the use of schemes in education is their differentiation [Kim et al., 2010;
Nussbaum and Edwards, 2011]. Students often fail to understand the differences
between various types of arguments, and the recent developments in education tend
to conflate the schemes instead of providing criteria for classifying or distinguishing
between them.
Fourth, schemes have now been recognized as important for argument mining,
and it has also been recognized that there are too many schemes for handy use
[Mochales Palau and Moens, 2009; Mochales Palau and Moens, 2011]. Configuring
the relationships between clusters of them, and the internal structure of each cluster,
would help in the research efforts to apply the schemes as working tools to a broader
range of problems as the field of computational linguistics has moved forward.
From a theoretical point of view, schemes fit into current formal argumentation
models such as ASPIC+ [Prakken et al., 2015], DefLog [Verheij, 2003a] and the
Carneades Argumentation System [Walton and Gordon, 2012]. Among the basic
schemes presented in the list of 60+ schemes in chapter 9 of [Walton et al., 2008]
are argument from expert opinion, argument from sign, argument from example,
argument from commitment, argument from position to know, argument from lack of
knowledge, practical reasoning (argument from goal to action), argument from cause
to effect, the sunk costs argument, argument from analogy, ad hominem argument,
and the slippery slope argument. These schemes are at this point well enough
recognized in the argumentation literature that no detailed account of them needs
to be given in this paper, except for the ones that we will focus on to illustrate
general characteristics of schemes discussed in detail in the paper.
Moreover, Walton and Sartor [Walton and Sartor, 2013] have shown that the
basic defeasible schemes can be justified by the teleological argument. According
to this reasoning, the use of a specific scheme is warranted by the fact that it can
serve an agent’s goals better than using nothing, and better than other alternative
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schemata the agent has at its disposal. This kind of justification of basic schemes
is essentially a practical one saying that these schemes, even at their current state
of development, are proving to be useful in such areas as artificial intelligence and
multiagent computing. Defeasible schemes allow agents to arrive at a presumptive
conclusion on how to proceed in a situation where continuing to collect evidence
may cause delay, taking time and costing money.
This form of justification of schemes applies both to goals of epistemic cognition
(getting to the truth of a matter) and goals of practical cognition (making the best
choice in given circumstances). The importance of the schemes has also been ac-
knowledged in the history of dialectics. The forms of argument, their critical and
defeasible dimension, and their structure was long ago acknowledged in the earlier
concerns of the Sophists, who pointed out forms of argument useful for persuasion
and deliberation [Schiappa, 1999; Tindale, 2010]. In the Topics [Aristotle, 1991b]
and in the Rhetoric [Aristotle, 1991a], Aristotle set out a list of topics that, pro-
viding the abstract and general hypothetical premises of dialectical syllogisms, can
be considered to be the predecessors of the argument patterns developed in modern
times [Macagno et al., 2014; Rubinelli, 2009; Macagno et al., 2014].
The tradition of the topics was continued through the Middle Ages, with var-
ious theories aimed at providing a classification and an analysis of the nature of
the schemes [Bird, 1962; Gabbay and Woods, 2008; Green-Pedersen, 1984; Green-
Pedersen, 1987; Stump, 1982; Stump, 1989]. Study of the kinds of schemes that are
the focus of this paper was eclipsed during the Enlightenment, as the dominant view
became firmly entrenched that the only forms of reasoning that can be identified
with rational thinking are those of deductive logic, and inductive reasoning of the
kind used in games of chance. But the study of these schemes made a comeback
in the 20th century at the beginning of, and after the rise of argumentation stud-
ies as a respectable discipline, once the basic schemes were identified by Hastings
[1963], Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca [1969], Kienpointner [1992], Walton [1995],
Grennan [1997], and Walton, Reed and Macagno [2008]. From that point onwards,
the study of schemes has been recognized as important for building computational
models of argumentation, and especially for applying these models to argumentation
in natural language discourse.
2.3 Classification of the schemes: how to proceed
In this paper, it is shown how the complex project of classifying schemes needs
to proceed by matching a top-down approach with a bottom-up approach, and in
particular that this bottom-up approach needs to begin by studying relationships
between clusters of nested schemes. From a top-down approach, dichotomic criteria
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of classification need to be found, allowing the user to decide the scheme needed,
both by direct identification and by exclusion. For this purpose, an overview of the
existing classification systems developed in the tradition and in the recent theories
can provide useful criteria. From a bottom-up approach, relationships within groups
of schemes need to be studied, and then how one group fits with another can be
studied. Walton [2012] took a bottom-up approach that began with some examples
at the ground level of cases where two schemes seem to apply to the same real
example of an argument found in a text, leading to a difficulty of determining which
scheme fits the argument. Working from there, we identify clusters of schemes that
fit together, and then at the next step, we examine how these clusters can be fitted
together. Once clusters of schemes are fitted together into larger groups, we can
gradually learn how they fit into an overarching system.
3 The topics in the dialectical and rhetorical tradition
Argumentation schemes describe patterns from which specific arguments can be
drawn. In this sense, they can be seen as the modern development of the traditional
concept of topos, the conditional expressing a generic principle from which some of
the specific premises warranting the conclusion in an argument can be drawn. The
purpose of this section is to show how the ancient account of topoi and loci can be
considered as the ground and the predecessor of the modern theory of schemes.
3.1 Aristotle
The idea of providing general principles of inference from which various arguments
can be drawn was the ground of Aristotle’s Topics and Rhetoric. The Aristotelian
topoi can be conceived as principles [De Pater, 1965, pp.150–159] having often the
form of “P, then Q”. The various semantic (material) relations between P and Q, or
the “nature of the things which the terms of the argument represent or stand for”
[Green-Pedersen, 1987, p.413], constitute the differences between the various topoi.
For example, P and Q can be related by a relation of genus-species, definiens-
definiendum, contraries, similarity, etc. The function of the topoi in the mechanism
of argument production can be explained as follows [Slomkowski, 1997, p.45]:
The enthymemes seem to be instances of topoi; or, expressed differently, en-
thymemes are arguments which are warranted by the principle expressed in the
topos. Thus hypothetical syllogism would fall under a topos insofar as it falls
under its major premiss in which the essence of the hypothetical syllogism is
expressed.
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Topoi can be considered as the external general rules of reasoning of an enthymeme,
or the genera of the major premises of dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms. Topoi
can work as rules, namely as the principle of inference guaranteeing the passage from
an enthymematic premise to the conclusion. For example, we consider the following
enthymeme [Slomkowski, 1997, p.51]: âĂć
âĂć Doing greater injustice is a greater evil.
âĂć From “what is more A is more B”, you may infer: “A is B”.
âĂć Doing injustice is an evil.
The topos can be also used as a general principle from which it is possible to draw
the specific premises of a hypothetical syllogism [Bird, 1960; Bird, 1962; Macagno et
al., 2014]. For example, the same argument mentioned above can be completed by
adding the major premise that is an instantiation (an axiom-instance) of the topos
from the more [Slomkowski, 1997, p.53] (Table 2):
General principle If being more A is more B, then A is B.
Specific instantiation of
the topos as a premise
If doing greater injustice (A) is a greater evil
(B), then doing injustice (A) is an evil (B).
Minor premise Doing greater injustice (A) is a greaterevil (B).
Conclusion Doing injustice (A) is an evil (B)
Table 2: Topoi as general principles of inference
The aforementioned mechanism of specification (or instantiation) of the topoi brings
to light a fundamental distinction that Aristotle draws between generic topoi and the
idia (the specific topics) [Rubinelli, 2009, pp.59–70]. While generic topoi are abstract
and commonly shared conditionals under which specific premises can be found, the
specific topoi represent premises warranting the conclusion ([De Pater, 1965, p.134];
[Stump, 1989, p.29]) that are accepted within specific disciplines, such as ethics,
law, or medicine. For example, consider the following specific topic [Lawson, 1885,
p.262]:
Where a person does an act, he is presumed in so doing to have intended that
the natural and legal consequences of his act shall result.
In specific domains of knowledge, specific topoi can be listed as instruments of in-
vention, premises that can be used to construct arguments in support of typical
conclusions.
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Generic topics can be considered as abstractions from the specific ones, or
more correctly, an abstraction from a large number of specific topics. They pro-
vide classes of both necessary and defeasible inferences [Bird, 1960; Bird, 1962;
Christensen, 1988; Drehe, 2011; Stump, 2004]. In the first class fall some maxims
setting out definitional properties of meta-semantic concepts, i.e. concepts represent-
ing semantic relations between concepts, such as definition, genus, and property. For
example the locus from definition, which establishes the convertibility between def-
inition and definiendum, represents also the essential logical characteristic that a
predicate needs to have in order be considered as a “discourse signifying what a
thing is.” Other loci, such as the ones based on analogy or the more and the less,
are only defeasible, as they represent only commonly accepted relationships. In the
Topics [Aristotle, 1991b], Aristotle focuses most of his analysis on the topics govern-
ing the meta-semantic relations between concepts, i.e. genus, property, definition,
and accident. The Aristotelian account was developed in the Latin and medieval
dialectical tradition, which developed classifications of the topics (called loci) based
on the type of material relation they represent.
3.2 Cicero
Cicero [Cicero, 2003] reduced the Aristotelian list of topoi to 20 loci or maxims,
grouping them in generic categories (differences) and dividing them in two broad
classes, the intrinsic and the extrinsic topics [Stump, 1989]. While the first ones
proceed directly from the subject matter at issue (for instance, its semantic prop-
erties), the external topics (the Aristotelian arguments from authority) support the
conclusion through contextual elements (for instance, the source of the speech act
expressing the claim) (Cicero, Topica, 8, 3–4). In between there are the topics that
concern the relationship between a predicate and the other predicates of a linguistic
system (for instance, its relations with its contraries or alternatives). We represent
the topics of Cicero in Table 3 below.
Cicero pointed out some loci that, on his view, are principally used by dialec-
ticians. Such topics, named loci from antecedents, consequents, and incompatibles
(no. 8, 9, and 10 in Table 1), represent patterns of reasoning based only on the
meaning of the connector of the hypothetical premise (if...then). For instance, if
such a premise holds, and the antecedent is affirmed, the consequent follows nec-
essarily (topic from antecedents) (Cicero, Topica, 53, 1–25). These loci seem to
be aimed at establishing commitments based on previous commitments. In other
words, instead of increasing the acceptability of a viewpoint based on the accept-
ability of the content of the premises on which it is grounded, such topics lead the
interlocutor to the acceptance of a conclusion because of his previous acceptance of
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Table 3: Cicero - Classification of generic topics
other propositions [Green-Pedersen, 1984, p.256].
Cicero connected the theory of topics to the division of discourse according to
the Hermagoras stasis, the issue of the discussion, formulating the proposition to be
proved or disputed [Kennedy, 1963, p.303]. He provided a classification of the topics
according to their function for addressing a specific type of issue, namely conjecture,







cause and effect, adiuncta.
Comparison
Table 4: Cicero - Division of topics by issue
Cicero’s classification of topics became the ground for Boethius’ works, which
are the basis of the medieval dialectical tradition ([Stump, 1982]; [Stump, 1989];
[Stump, 2004]).
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3.3 Boethius
Boethius commented on and organized Cicero’s loci in his In Ciceronis Topica and
De Topicis Differentiis, distinguishing between necessary and plausible connections
and between dialectical and rhetorical loci. The treatise on De Topicis Differen-
tiis includes loci that in Cicero and previously in Aristotle were distinguished as
dialectical and rhetorical topics.
Boethius underscored how while dialectical loci stem from the rules of predic-
tion and the logic-semantic properties of the predicates, rhetorical topoi represent
the possible connections between things having different qualities (De Topicis Dif-
ferentiis,1215C).1 Some dialectical topics, such as topics from definition or genus
and species, are necessary [Macagno and Walton, 2014, Ch.3], while others (for in-
stance, from adiuncta) represent only frequent connections. This relation between
probable and necessary consequence was studied in the Middle Ages. Garlandus
Compotista classified topics according to their logical (demonstrative) role. Topics
from whole (which includes definition and genus), along with part and equal became
the foundations of categorical syllogism [Stump, 1982, p.277].
In Boethius the Aristotelian topoi are interpreted as maximae propositiones
falling under differentiae, genera of these maxims. Maximae propositiones are gen-
eral principles, also called axioms. They are general (indefinite in respect to par-
ticulars) and generic propositions that several arguments can instantiate, and they
have warranting the conclusion in an argument as a primary role. The relationship
between the terms of the premises and the conclusion, namely the respect under
which they are regarded, is called differentia, representing the criterion of appropri-
ateness or the genus of maxims. The maxim is found from the genus of the maximae
propositiones and the relationship between the terms of the first premise [Stump,
1989, p.6]. The structure of a topic are illustrated in Table 5.
First term: Every virtue is advantageous.
Middle term: Justice is a virtue.
Second term: Therefore justice is advantageous.
Maxim: What belongs to the genus, belongs to the species.
Differentia: From the whole, i.e. the genus
Table 5: Argument and maxim in Boethius
1Rhetorical loci are similar in form to the dialectical ones, but they proceed from frequent
connections between things, from stereotypes and not from semantic properties of concepts (for
instance, usually people addicted to alcohol are dissolute, this person is alcoholic, therefore he is
dissolute. See Boethius De Topicis Differentiis1215b).
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Topoi are divided into three main categories: intrinsic, extrinsic and intermedi-
ate. While the first two categories are similar to Cicero’s organization, the third is
based on different principles. Loci medii represent semantic connections of gram-
matical relations, such as from words stemming from the same root, or semantic
relations of division underlying the definition of the word (Table 6).
Intrinsic Loci
Extrinsic Loci
From substance From things accompanying the substance
· From the definition
· From the description 
· From the explanation of the 
name
· From estimation about 
a thing
· From similar
· From what is more




· From inflections 
· From coordinates 
· From division 
· From the whole 
(genus)
· From the integral 
whole
· From a part (species)
· From the parts of an 
integral whole
· From efficient cause
· From the matter
· From the end
· From the form
· From the generation 
(effects)
· From the corruption
· From uses
· From associated 
accidents
· From contraries 
· From opposites with 
reference to privation 
and possession 
· From relative opposites
· From opposites with 
reference to affirmation 
and negation 
· From transumption 
Table 6: Boethius - Division of the dialectical loci
Boethius distinguishes the dialectical loci from the rhetorical ones. Rhetorical
topics are drawn from not from the concepts (representing the abstract relations
between concepts), but from the things and how things usually are. For example,
while the dialectical topic from genus proceeds from the definition of a concept (if
a person is drunk, he is also intoxicated), the rhetorical one concerns how a more
generic concept is usually related to a more specific one (usually if someone is not
dissipated, he does not get drunk). Boethius takes from Cicero the rhetorical topics,
not dealing with the abstract principles of inference concerning concepts, but with
the circumstances concerning the specific cases2. For instance, reasoning from place,
2They are different from the preceding topics, because the preceding topics either contained
deeds or adhered to deeds in such a way that they could not be separated, as place, time, and
the rest, which do not desert the action performed. But those things that are associated with the
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name, time depends on the fact, stem from the factors of the event and not from
the logic-semantic relations between concepts. The rhetorical topics are organized












· Gist of the deed
(Murder of a relative)
· Before the deed (He
stole a sword)
· While the deed occurs
(He struck violently)
· After the deed (He hid









· By what name to call what has been done
· Who are the doers of the deed
· Who approve of its having been thought up
· What is the law, custom, agreement, judgment, opinion, and theory
for the thing.
· Whether the thing is contrary to custom
· Whether men generally agree to these things.















Table 7: Boethius - Division of the rhetorical loci
3.4 Abaelardus
During the Middle Ages, the focal point of the study of argument was the connec-
tion between dialectics and demonstration. Beginning with the XI century, Garlan-
dus Compotista analysed the categorical syllogisms as proceeding from topics from
whole, part, and equal. On the other hand, he conceived all the topics under the log-
ical forms of topics from antecedent and consequent, whose differentiae (the genera
of maximae propositiones) are the syllogistic rules [Stump, 1982, p.277]. In the XII
action do not adhere to the action itself but are accidents of the circumstances, and they provide
an argument only when they enter into comparison. The arguments, however, are taken not from
contrariety but from a contrary, and not from similarity but from a similar, so that the argument
seems to be taken not from a relationship [such as contrariety] but from things associated with the
action [such as contraries]. Those things are associated with the action which are related to the
very action at issue (De Topicis Differentiis,1214B 6-1214C 19).
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century, Abelard in his Dialectica examined the structure of dialectical consequence
in its components for the first time [Kienpointner, 1987, p.283]).
Abelard described topics as imperfect inferences, different from valid categorical
syllogisms. In this work, the maxima propositio, expressing a principle of inference,
is related to the function of invention. The maxima is the general principle that is
useful for finding the propositions accepted by everybody or the by the wise (the
endoxa) relative to the subject dealt with in the argument. From this perspective,
the structure of an argument is similar to a syllogism. The main difference lies in
the nature of the assumptions, the propositions connecting the general principles to
the subject of the reasoning. While dialectical inferences depend on the content of
the propositions (or, rather, on the terms and their connections), syllogisms depend
only on the form. The difference between form and content can be explained with
the following cases. A syllogism such as:
Every man is an animal
But every animal is animate
Therefore, every man is animate
depends on a rule of inference, that is [Abaelardus, 1970, p.262]:
posito antecedenti ponitur consequens (if the antecedent is affirmed, the conse-
quent is affirmed as well))
The connection between the terms of the inference depends only on their position
in the propositions. On the other hand, dialectical inferences cannot be resolved
only by considering the positions of the terms. These inferences are imperfect, since
assumptions are needed for the conclusion to follow from the premises. For instance,
the consequence
If he is a man, he is an animate being
is necessarily valid since it is known that “animate being” is the genus of man and
“whatever is predicated of the species is predicated of the genus as well.” The
inference depends on the local connection between the terms, on the habitudo. The
habitudo is the topical relation, the semantic-ontological respect under which the
terms are connected to each other in a (dialectical) syllogism ([Green-Pedersen, 1984,
p.185]; [Green-Pedersen, 1987, p.415]), and on which the strength of the inference
depends [Abaelardus, 1970, pp.254-257]. The mechanism of an argument scheme
can be shown by the ancient model of Abelard [Abaelardus, 1970, p.315], in which
the assumptions were connected to the axioms, to the maxims the locus proceeded
from [Stump, 1989, p.36] (Table 8).
Macagno, Walton and Reed
Consequence If Socrates is a man, he is an animate being. 
Maxim What the species is said of, the genus is said of as well. 
Assumption But "man," which is the species of"animate being" is said of 
Socrates; also therefore "animate being," which is clearly its genus. 
Assumption 1 "Man" is a species of"animate being." 
Syllogism 1 • What the species is said of, the genus is said of as well. 
• Man is species of"animate being" . 
• Therefore, if man is said of anything, "animate being" is said of it 
as well. 
Syllogism 2 • If "man" is said of anything, "animate being" is said of it as well. 
• Socrates is a man . 
• Therefore Socrates is an animate being . 
Table 8: Rules of inference and the material structure of arguments in Abelard
In the example above, the passage from the predicate “to be a man” attributed
to the subject to the different predicate “to be an animate being” is grounded on
a relation of semantic inclusion between these two predicates, i.e. a genus-species
relation [Bird, 1962]. This relationship guarantees the inference based on a rule
(the maxim) that expresses a necessary consequence of the concept of genus itself.
The genus expresses the generic fundamental features of a concept, answering to
the question “what is it?” and is attributed to all the concepts different in kind
(Aristotle, Topics 102a 31-32). For this reason, it is predicated of what the species
is predicated of.
After Abelard, in the 12th century, the notion of form of inference was developed
into a reduction of all topical inferences to syllogisms. Later on, in the 13th century
analytical consequences were analysed as following from topics “dici de omni” and
“dici de nullo” (Every A is B, Every B is C, therefore every A is C ). Demonstration
is for this reason based on a topical relation (from the whole)[Green-Pedersen, 1984,
p.256].
4 Modern Theories of Schemes
In the modern and contemporary theories on argumentation (or argument) schemes,
several types of classification have been advanced [Walton et al., 2008]. In this
section, the most relevant theories on schemes and the classification thereof will be
summarized.
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4.1 Perelman and the New Rhetoric
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca divided their system of topoi into two broad cate-
gories, defined based on the two purposes that they considered to be the basic ones,
finding associations and dissociations between concepts [Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca, 1969, p.190]. According to the New Rhetoric, arguments from association
are divided in three main classes: Quasi-logical Arguments, Relations Establishing
the Structure of Reality, and Arguments based on the Structure of Reality, while
dissociation constitutes a distinct class. This classification can be represented in
Table 9.
Table 9: Classification of the arguments in the New Rhetoric
This classification is based several criteria, namely on the conceptual/ontological
structure (association-dissociation; the reference to the structure of reality), the log-
ical structure (quasi-logical vs. non-logical arguments), and the type of relations
between concepts (sequential vs. coexistence). However, the interrelation between
all these criteria is not specified, and there is not a unique rationale linking all such
different arguments.
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4.2 Toulmin
A different approach is provided by Toulmin, Rieke and Janik (1984), in which
they classified arguments based on the basic functions of the warrants on which
the arguments are grounded. Nine general classes of arguments were distinguished,
subdivided into subclasses [Toulmin et al., 1984], shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Classification of the arguments in Toulmin
Also in this case, different criteria are used in the classification. Some schemes
represent types of reasoning (such as generalization, sign, or analogy); others are
characterized by logical rules of inference (dilemma, opposites); others refer to the
content of the argument (authority, classification, cause, degree). The relationship
between the various criteria is not given.
4.3 Kienpointner
Kienpointner in Alltagslogik provides a complex and fine-grained classification, based
on four criteria: 1) the type of inference; 2) the epistemic nature of the premises;
3) the dialectical function of the conclusion; and 4) the pragmatic function of the
conclusion. On his view, every scheme 1) can proceed from different logical rules;
2) must be real (namely based upon the truth or likeliness of the premises), or
fictive (grounded upon the mere possibility) (epistemic nature of the premises); 3)
it must be pro or contra a certain thesis (dialectical function); and 4) it must have
either a descriptive or a normative conclusion (pragmatic function) [Kienpointner,
1992, p.241]. In this sense, all the schemes can have descriptive or normative, pro
or contra, real or fictive variants. The classification provided in Alltagslogik groups
21 schemes in three abstract classes characterized by the typology of the inferential
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rule: argument schemes using a rule; argument schemes establishing a rule by means
of induction; argument schemes both using and establishing a rule (Figure 2).
Figure 2: Classification of the arguments in Kienpointner
The first class, as shown in Figure 2, is subdivided in its turn in four content-
based categories: classification, comparison, opposition, and causal schemes [Kien-
pointner, 1992, p.246]. Based on the aforementioned criteria, all the argument
schemes may in turn have descriptive or normative variants, different logical forms
(Modus Ponens, Modus Tollens, Disjunctive Syllogism, etc.), different dialectical
purposes (establishing or countering a viewpoint), and different word-world relation
(fictive – real).
This system of classification is aimed at distinguishing first the type of reasoning
(induction, deduction), and then differentiating between the various material rela-
tions. The possible limitation of this system is that while the material relation of
many deductive schemes is specified and distinguished, the content dimension of the
inductive schemes is not pointed out.
4.4 Pragma-Dialectics
The pragma-dialectical system of classification of schemes consists of three basic
schemes [Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992]: 1) symptomatic argumentation; 2)
argumentation based on similarities; and 3) the instrumental argumentation. The
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first scheme represents type of argumentation in which the speaker tries to convince
his interlocutor “by pointing out that something is symptomatic of something else.”
In this type of pattern, what is stated in the argument premise is a sign or symptom
of what is stated in the conclusion. The second scheme is grounded on a relation
of analogy between what is stated in the argument premise and what is stated in
the conclusion. In the third type of scheme the argument and the conclusion are
linked by a very broad relation of causality. Other arguments are classified under
these categories [Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992]. For instance, arguments
based on inherent qualities or a characteristic part of an entity or from authority are
regarded as belonging to the symptomatic argumentation; arguments pointing out
the consequences of an action or based on the means-end relationship are considered
as subclasses of causal arguments [Garssen, 2001].
This system of classification is grounded on a twofold criterion. While causal
argumentation is characterized by a material relation, analogical argumentation rep-
resents a type of reasoning independent from the specific content of the premises and
conclusion. Symptomatic argumentation is a combination of these two criteria, as a
sign or a symptom presupposes an abductive pattern and a material causal relation.
4.5 Grennan
In Grennan’s [Grennan, 1997, pp.163-165] typology, the structurally valid inductive3
inference patterns are classified according to 9 warrant types, derived from Ehninger
and Brockreide’s typology [Brockriede and Ehninger, 1963]. The warrant types
include possible reasons for inferring conclusions from premises, all belonging to
the “logical mode” (and not to other types of motivations, such as emotions). The
argument patterns can be summarized as follows:
1. Cause to Effect: The phenomenon mentioned in P produces the one in C.
2. Effect to Cause: The phenomenon mentioned in P is best explained by C.
3. Sign: The phenomenon mentioned in P is symptomatic (naturally or conventionally)
of one reported in C.
4. Sample to Population: What is true of sample of X is also true of other Xs.
5. Parallel Case: What is true of the referent of P is also true of other Xs.
6. Analogy: B1 is to B2 in C as A1 is to A2 in P.
7. Population to Sample: What is true of Known Xs is also true of this X.
3Inferences, in an informal logic perspective, are considered inductive, since argumentation
does not deal with deductive validity. The criterion for discriminating between acceptable and
unacceptable patterns is provided by a logical intuition.
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8. Authority: S (the assertor of C ) is a reliable source.
9. Ends-Means: The action mentioned in C generally achieves the end mentioned in
P.
The patterns mentioned above are individuated on the basis of the warrant type.
Together with this criterion of argument classification, Grennan presents a typology
of claims. Each argument can be analysed relative to the type of warrant and to
the kind of conclusion to be supported. The types of claim identified by Grennan
[Grennan, 1997, p.162] can be represented in Table 10.
Type of Claim Example
1. Obligation Claims: 
X must do A. 
“Sam must apologize.”
2. Supererogatory Actuative Claims: 
X ought to do A (they express a judgment that is in 
the interests of someone other than X for X to do A) 
“I ought to help the needy in this area.”
3. Prudential Actuative Claims: 
X ought to do A. 
“Canadians ought to avoid heart diseases.”
4. Evaluative Claims, of which there are three 
kinds: grading, rating, and comparison. 
“This is a good cantaloupe.”  “Steffi Graf is the 
best female tennis player at this time.” “Gretzky 
is a better hockey player than Howe was.”
5. Physical-World Claims, which include both 
physical brute facts and institutional facts. 
“The sun is setting.” 
“The Dodgers beat the Giants three to two in 
eleven innings.” 
6. Mental-World Claims, which ascribe mental 
phenomena. 
“He is upset.”
7. Constitutive-Rule Claims, which are based on 
definitions and other necessary truths and 
falsehoods. 
“In this election, majority should be defined as a 
majority of members present and voting.” 
“Solid iron does not float in water.”
8. Regulative-Rule Claims, which express 
obligations and prohibitions.
“Driving on the right is obligatory.”
Table 10: Grennan: Classification of schemes
The types of warrant and the types of claim are the two criteria underlying Gren-
nan’s typology of argument patterns, each characterized by a premise, a warrant,
and a conclusion. In the diagram below are represented the valid and useful patterns
of arguments for obligation claims resulting from this classification [Grennan, 1997,
p.162] (Figure 3).
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Figure 3: Classification of the arguments for obligation claims in Grennan
Grennan’s typology develops the distinction between the warrant type and the
kind of conclusion. The typology is extremely deep as regards the relation between
speech acts and argument, but is limited to 8 warrant types.
4.6 Katzav and Reed
Rooted in the schemes presented by Walton [Walton, 1995], the classification system
of Katzav and Reed [Katzav and Reed, 2004b] aims to classify an argument by
virtue of the “relation of conveyance” that the complex proposition constituting the
argument represents. These relations of conveyance describe how it is that one fact
necessitates another, such as in the following example [Katzav and Reed, 2004a,
p.2]:
Consider, by way of illustration, a case in which the causal relation is oper-
ative: in the circumstances, the fact that the US military attacked Iraq caused
the fall of Saddam′s regime. Thus, in the circumstances, and via or in virtue of
the obtaining of a causal relation, the fact that the US military attacked Iraq
necessitated, or made it liable that, Saddam′s regime fell.
Using the causal relation and the above statements about Saddam′s regime,
we can construct the following simple argument:
(1) Saddam′s regime fell, because the US military attacked Iraq and if the
US military were to attack Iraq, Saddam′s regime would fall.
In (1), the fact that the US military attacked Iraq is represented as con-
veying, via the causal relation, the fact that Saddam′s regime fell. That the
relation of conveyance represented is the causal relation is implicit in the sub-
junctive conditional “if the US military were to attack Iraq, Saddam′s regime
would fall.”
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In [Katzav and Reed, 2004b] the nature of such relations of conveyance is unpacked
and connected to the concepts of warrant and scheme and to the work of Kien-
pointner [Kienpointner, 1992] and Walton [Walton, 1995]in particular. In [Katzav
and Reed, 2004a], they sketch a high-level classification of relations of conveyance.
At the topmost level, they distinguish between “internal” and “external” relations,
whereby the former depend solely upon intrinsic features (and therefore encompass
definitional, cladistic, mereological and normative relations, amongst others), whilst
external relations depend upon extrinsic features (thereby covering such as spa-
tiotemporal and casual relations, amongst others). Beneath this, the classification
is further broken down into groups of schemes: those of specification, constitution,
analyticity and identity under intrinsic relations and causal and non-causal under
extrinsic (due largely to the fact that so many schemes rely upon causal relations).
The full top-level classification tree (which identifies the main branches but does not
give an exhaustive specification) is given in the scheme below:
Internal relation of conveyance
Relation of specification
• Relation of species to genus
• Relation of species to genus




• Abstract fact constitution
• Constitution of normative facts
• Constitution of positive normative facts
• Constitution of negative normative facts
• Constitution of non-normative abstract facts
• Constitution of necessary conditions
• Constitution of causal law
• Constitution of singular causal conditionals
• Constitution of constitution facts
• Constitution of Possibility
• Constitution of Impossibility
• Etc.
Concrete fact constitution
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• Species/kind instance constitution
• Property instance constitution
• Property constitution by properties
• Property constitution by particulars
• Etc.
• Constitution of singular causal facts
• Relation of a part to a whole
• Relation of whole to one of its parts
• Etc.
Relation of analyticity
• Relation of sameness of meaning
• Relation of stipulative definition
• Relation of implication
Relation of identity
• Relation of qualitative identity
• Relation of numerical identity
• Etc.











• Thing location incompatibility
• Thing type incompatibility
• Etc.
• Topological structure conveyance
Causal dependence
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• Efficient cause conveyance
• Causal law
• Singular cause to effect
• Singular effect to cause
• Common cause
• Final cause conveyance
Though the mapping from individual relations of conveyance in this classification to
the argumentation schemes in [Walton, 1995] and particularly [Walton et al., 2008]is
not a trivial 1-to-1 correspondence, those schemes have been slotted in successfully
in later work with a computational focus such as [Bex and Reed, 2011].
4.7 Lumer and Dove
The last system of classification that we consider was provided by Lumer and Dove
(Lumer & Dove, 2011), using three general classes, each including subclasses:
1. Deductive argument schemes
• Elementary deductive argument schemes;
• Analytical arguments:
• Definitoric arguments
• Subsuming legal arguments:
2. Probabilistic argument schemes
• Pure probabilistic argument schemes (statistics, signs);
• Impure probabilistic argument schemes (best explanation);
3. Practical argument schemes
• Pure practical argument for pure evaluations;
• Impure practical argument schemes (for justification of actions; justification of instru-
ments);
• Arguments for evaluations based on adequacy conditions;
• Arguments for welfare-ethical value judgements;
• Practical arguments for theoretical theses.
This system consists of a mix of two distinct criteria, logical and pragmatic. While
the first two classes are characterized by the type of reasoning, the last one is a
type of argument with a specific pragmatic purpose, recommending a course of
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action. Moreover, the subclasses are defined based on both logic-based and content-
based criteria, where together with distinctions based on the logical form (analytic
schemes; probabilistic schemes) there are subclasses based on the nature of the
premises (definitoric; subsuming).
All these types of classification show how a sole criterion is not sufficient for
providing a clear and comprehensive classification of schemes. In order to under-
stand what criteria can be used and in what abstract categories can be considered
as the most basic ones, it is necessary to analyze the structure of the schemes. Once
the common components of these heterogeneous combinations of premises and con-
clusions are brought to light, it is possible to find criteria for organizing them for
specific purposes.
5 Using the schemes: A classification system
Argumentation schemes can be conceived as the prototypical combination of seman-
tic (or topical) relations with logical rules of inference [Macagno and Walton, 2015;
Macagno et al., 2016; Walton and Macagno, 2015]. A classification based on the
semantic link can provide an instrument for bringing to light the material relation
between premises and conclusion, but the same semantic relation can be combined
with types and rules of reasoning, and lead to various types of conclusion. For in-
stance, causal relations are the ground of the argument from cause to effect, but
also of arguments from sign and practical reasoning. Argumentation schemes merge
the most common combinations between types of reasoning and material relations.
For this reason, we need first to distinguish between these two levels, distinguishing
between the various types of reasoning in Table 11.
Table 11: Types of argument and types of reasoning
Argumentation Schemes
A multi-logical perspective needs to be taken into account as a classification
criterion, in which the logical form can be described using distinct types of reasoning,
which in turn can include various logical rules of inference (MP, MT). However,
in the Latin and Medieval tradition, the formal rules of inference are treated as
maxims and not as distinct levels of abstraction. For this reason, the two levels of
the general, semantic topics and of the logical rules are not distinguished, and the
possible interconnections between them are not taken into account. The modern
theories of argumentation schemes propose classifications essentially mirroring the
ancient approach. The logical rules are treated at the same level as the semantic-
ontological topics, and not as distinct levels of abstraction. A possible solution is
to acknowledge the discrepancy between logical form and semantic content as a
divergence in kind, and try to show how these two levels can be interconnected.
A possible overarching principle can be found in the pragmatic function of the
schemes, namely what they have been intended for. Argumentation schemes can
be thought of as instruments for reconstructing and building arguments (intended
as discourse moves), i.e. analytical or invention tools. For this reason, in order
to provide a classificatory system to retrieve and detect the needed scheme it can
be useful to start from the intended purpose of an argumentation scheme. From
an analytical point of view, the analysis of an argument in a discourse, a text,
or dialogue presupposes a previous understanding of the communicative goal (and,
therefore, the “pragmatic” meaning) of the argument and the components thereof.
For example, an argument can be aimed at classifying a state of affairs, supporting
the existence of a state of affairs, or influencing a decision-making process.
This teleological classification needs to be combined with a practical one. The
generic purposes of a move need to be achieved by means of an inferential passage.
In this sense, the classificatory system needs to account for the possible (argumenta-
tive) means to achieve the pragmatic purpose of an argument. Not all the semantic
relations underlying the schemes can support all the possible conclusions or purposes
of an argument. Definitional schemes are aimed at supporting the classification of
a state of affairs; they cannot lead to the prediction or retrodiction of an event.
Similarly, a pattern of reasoning based on the evaluation of the consequences of an
action or an event can be used to establish the desirability of a course of action
brining it about. However, it cannot be reasonably used to establish the truth or
falsity (or acceptability) of a proposition. For this reason, the analysis of the prag-
matic meaning (i.e. the purpose) of an argument provides a criterion for restricting
the paradigm of the possible means to achieve it. The crucial problem is to find
categories of argument purposes that can establish criteria for distinguishing among
classes of semantic relations, which in turn can be specified further according to the
means to achieve such goals.
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The first distinction to be made is based on the nature of the subject matter,
which can be 1) a course of action or 2) a state of affairs. In the first case, the goal
is to support the desirability or non-desirability of an action; in the second case,
the schemes are aimed at providing grounds for the acceptability of a judgment on
a state of affairs. The ancient dialectical accounts (Cicero, Topica; Boethius, De
Topicis Differentiis) distinguished between two types of argumentative “means” to
support a conclusion, namely the “internal” and the “external” arguments. The first
ones are based on the characteristics of the subject matter (such as arguments from
definition or cause). The latter derive their force from the source of the statement,
namely from the authority of who advances the judgment or the proposal (arguments
from authority). This first distinction can be represented as shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Purposes of an argument
The acceptability of a conclusion can be supported externally in two ways. If
the argument is aimed at establishing the desirability of a course of action, the
authority can correspond to the role of the source (“You should do it because he
told you that!”). Otherwise, the popular practice can be a reason for pursuing a
course of action (“We should buy a bigger car. Everyone drives big cars here!”).
External arguments can be represented in Figure 5.
Figure 5: External arguments
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When external arguments are used to support also a judgment on a state of
affairs, the relevant quality of the source is not the speaker’s authority (connected
with the consequences of not complying with the orders/conforming to common
behavior) but rather with the source’s superior knowledge. The quality of the source
can be also used negatively to show that a source is not reliable (it is not a good
source), and that consequently the conclusion itself should be considered as doubtful
(ad hominem arguments).
Internal arguments can be divided into the two categories of arguments aimed
at assessing the desirability of a course of action, and the ones supporting the ac-
ceptability of a judgment. Courses of action can be classified as desirable or not
depending on the quality of their consequences (the course of action is a condition
of a resulting positive or negative state of affairs) or their function in bringing about
a desired goal (an action is productive of a pursued state of affairs) (Figure 6).
Figure 6: Internal practical arguments
The arguments used to provide grounds for a judgment on a state of affairs can
be divided according to the nature of the predicate that is to be attributed. The
most basic differentiation can be traced between the predicates that attribute the
existence of a state of affairs (the occurrence of an event or the existence of an
entity in the present, the past, or the future), and the ones representing factual or
evaluative properties.
The arguments supporting a prediction or a retrodiction are aimed at establishing
whether or not an event has occurred or will occur, or whether an entity was or will be
present (existent). The arguments proceeding from casual relations (in particular
from material and efficient causes) bear out this type of conclusion. The other
type of predicates can be divided in two categories: factual judgments and value
judgments. The first type of predicates can be attributed by means of reasoning
from classification, grounded on descriptive (definitional) features and supporting
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the attribution of a categorization to an entity or an event (Bob is a man; Tom
is a cat). Value judgments are classifications that are not based on definitions of
categorical concepts (to be a cat) but rather on values, or rather hierarchies of values.
Such judgments proceed from criteria (or more specifically, criteria of importance to
the audience to whom the argument is presented) for classifying what is commonly
considered to be “good” or “bad.” Also the reasoning underlying the attribution of
evaluative predicates, such as “to be a criminal,” can be considered as belonging to
this group of arguments. These latter patterns are grounded on signs of an internal
disposition of character, which in its turn is evaluated. The distinctions discussed
above are summarized in Figure 7 below.
Figure 7: Establishing the acceptability of a judgment (SoA)
This system of classification of argumentation schemes is based on the interaction
between two criteria, the (pragmatic) purpose of an argument and the means to
achieve it. This tree model can be used both for analytical and production purposes.
In the first case, the speaker’s intention is reconstructed by examining the generic
purpose of his move, and then the possible choices that he made to support it, based
on the linguistic elements of the text. Depending on the desired level of preciseness,
the analysis can be narrowed down until detecting the specific scheme, namely the
precise combination of the semantic principle and the logical rule supporting the
conclusion. In this fashion, the analyst can decide where to stop his reconstruction.
This analytical model can be of help also for educational purposes, as it can be
adapted to various teaching needs and levels. For production purposes, the nature
of the viewpoint to be supported can be analyzed using the most generic criteria
set out above (What is under discussion, a decision or a fact? The occurrence of an
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event or its classification? The naming of a state of affairs or its qualification?). Such
questions closely resemble the ones that were at the basis of the rhetorical theory
of stasis, namely the issues that can be discussed [Heath, 1994]. These distinctions
are then combined with the specific alternative strategies to support the defended
viewpoint.
The aforementioned system of classification can also account for the interrelation
between the semantic relation and the different types of reasoning, namely logical
forms. For example, the desirability of a course of action can be assessed internally
by taking into consideration the means to achieve a goal. This pattern of reasoning
can be stronger or weaker depending on whether there is only one or several alter-
natives. The paradigm of the possible means will determine whether the reasoning
is abductive or deductive, resulting in a more or less defeasible conclusion. The
same principle applies to the other semantic relations, such as the ones proceeding
from cause or classification, which can be shaped logically according to inductive,
analogical, deductive, or abductive types of reasoning.
6 A bottom-up approach to classification: Clusters of
decision-making schemes
Argumentation schemes are characterized by both “family” resemblances and ac-
tual interconnections [Walton and Macagno, 2015]. Practical reasoning, value-based
reasoning, value-based practical reasoning, argument from positive consequences,
argument from negative consequences, and the slippery slope argument are related
by the same similar structure based on value judgments and practical outcome.
Such schemes are often also interconnected when we analyze the structure of actual
arguments. However, in order to understand and choose between similar and inter-
related schemes, it is necessary to examine their relations and their differences. The
simplest and most intuitive version of the scheme for practical reasoning (Table 13)
uses the first-person pronoun “I” to represents a rational agent, an entity that has
goals, some knowledge of its circumstances, and the capability of taking action to
change those circumstances. It also has sensors to perceive its circumstances, and to
perceive at least some of the consequences of its actions when it acts to change its
circumstances. Such a rational agent also therefore has the capability for feedback.
When it perceives changes in its circumstances due to its own actions, it can modify
its actions or goals accordingly, depending on whether the consequences of its ac-
tions are deemed to contribute to its goals or not. This simplest form of practical
reasoning [Walton et al., 2008, p.95] can be described as a fast and frugal heuristic
for jumping to a quick conclusion that may later need to be retracted in the light of
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further considerations (Table 12).
Major Premise: I have a goal G.
Minor Premise: Carrying out this action A is a meansto realize G.
Conclusion: Therefore, I ought (practically speaking)to carry out this action A.
Table 12: Argument from Practical reasoning
The defeasible nature of this simple form of practical reasoning is brought out by
the observation that it typically provides a starting point for action that needs to
be challenged by the asking of critical questions as the agent moves ahead. Below
is the standard set of critical questions matching this scheme.
CQ1 What other goals do I have that should be considered that might conflict with
G?
CQ2 What alternative actions to my bringing about A that would also bring about
G should be considered?
CQ3 Among bringing about A and these alternative actions, which is arguably the
most efficient?
CQ4 What grounds are there for arguing that it is practically possible for me to
bring about A?
CQ5 What consequences of my bringing about A should also be taken into account?
The last critical question, CQ5, often called the side effects question, concerns as-
sessment of the potential negative consequences of carrying out the action described
in the conclusion of the scheme. If negative consequences of this course of action are
identified, that is a reason for withdrawing the conclusion and considering an alter-
native course of action that might avoid the negative consequences. Use of the term
“negative” implies that values are involved, and that a rational agent is assumed to
have values as well as goals that it bases its practical reasoning on.
A complication is that there is another closely related argumentation scheme
associated with this critical question, Argument from negative consequences. This
scheme, widely recognized in the literature, cites known or estimated consequences
of a proposed course of action as presenting a reason, or set of reasons, against taking
the course of action initially indicated by the practical reasoning scheme. Argument
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from negative consequences also has a positive form. According to the scheme for
argument from positive consequences, known or estimated consequences that have
a positive value for the agent are cited as a reason, or set of reasons, supporting
the carrying out of the action initially considered. Below the versions of the two
basic argumentation schemes for arguments from consequences are formulated as
they were in [Walton et al., 2008, p.101]. The first one is called argument from
positive consequences (Table 13).
Premise: If A is brought about, goodconsequences will plausibly occur.
Conclusion: Therefore A should be broughtabout.
Table 13: Argument from positive consequences
Premise: If A is brought about, badconsequences will plausibly occur.
Conclusion: Therefore A should not be broughtabout.
Table 14: Argument from negative consequences
The second one is called argument from negative consequences (Table 14).
In both instances, an implicit premise could be made explicit in the scheme stat-
ing that if good (bad) consequences will plausibly occur, A should (not) be brought
about. As with the basic form of practical reasoning, arguments from positive or
negative consequences are defeasible. The premise offers a reason to accept a pro-
posal for action tentatively, subject to exceptions as new circumstances come to be
known by the agent. In these formulations, the expression “good consequences”
refers to consequences taken by the agent to have positive value, and the expression
“bad consequences” refers to actions taken to have negative value. These observa-
tions bring us to another pair of schemes closely related to the ones for argument
from positive consequences and argument from negative consequences.
The relationship between a state of affairs, its classification according to a value,
and the commitment to an action is represented in terms of value. Values (differently
from [Atkinson et al., 2005];[Bench-Capon, 2003]) are regarded as grounds for a type
of reasoning independent from and related to (or rather, presupposed by) practical
reasoning. This reasoning guarantees the so-called “practical classification” [West-
berg, 2002, p.163] of a state of affairs and the commitment thereto. The scheme for
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argument from positive value is formulated in Table 15 as in [Walton et al., 2008,
p.321]:
Premise 1: Value V is positive as judged by agent A.
Premise 2: If V is positive, it is a reason for Ato commit to goal G.
Conclusion: V is a reason for A to committo goal G.
Table 15: Argument from positive value
The corresponding scheme representing argument for argument from negative
value is formulated in Table 16.
Premise 1: Value V is negative as judged by agent A.
Premise 2: If V is negative, it is a reason forretracting commitment to goal G.
Conclusion: V is a reason for retractingcommitment to goal G.
Table 16: Argument from negative value
Argument from positive consequences typically supports an argument taking
the form of basic practical reasoning by giving justification for going ahead with
the contemplated action. Argument from negative consequences presents a reason
against taking the action being considered by citing consequences of it that would
contravene the values of the agent.
Another more complex argumentation scheme has also been recognized in the
literature [Bench-Capon, 2003] that combines all the schemes mentioned above.
This scheme describes a form of argument called goal-based practical reasoning that
combines basic practical reasoning with value-based reasoning. The version of this
scheme (Table 17) is from [Walton et al., 2008, p.324].
The scheme for value-based practical reasoning can also be formulated in a more
explicit way that brings out an important aspect of practical reasoning, namely
the circumstances of the case that can be observed by the agent and used by as a
basis for reaching a decision on what to do. According to the version of the scheme
formulated in [Atkinson et al., 2005], any action the agent takes can be seen as a
transition from the current set of circumstances to a new set of circumstances, as
the agent moves forward to attempt to realize its goal.
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Premise 1: I have a goal G.
Premise 2: G is supported by my set of values, V.
Premise 3: Bringing about A is necessary (or sufficient)for me to bring about G.
Conclusion: Therefore, I should (practically ought to)bring about A.
Table 17: Argument from goal-based practical reasoning
The last decision-making argument is the slippery slope argument, sometimes
also called the wedge argument. Different varieties of slippery slope argument have
been recognized, such as the causal slippery slope argument, the precedent slip-
pery slope argument, the linguistic slippery slope argument, which depends on the
vagueness of terms or concepts, and a more complex (all-in) form of slippery slope
argument that combines the simpler variants. A good place to start is a simple
version of the slippery slope type of argument formulated as the basic scheme in
[Walton et al., 2008, p.340] (Table 18).
First Step
Premise:
A0 is up for consideration as a proposal that seems
initially like something that should be brought about.
Recursive
Premise:
Bringing up A0 would plausibly lead (in the given
circumstances) to A1, which would in turn plausibly
lead to A2, and so forth, through the sequence A2, . . . An.
Bad Outcome
Premise: An is a horrible (disastrous, bad) outcome.
Conclusion: A0 should not be brought about.
Table 18: Argument from goal-based practical reasoning
According to [Walton et al., 2008, p.340], the following three critical questions
match this basic scheme.
CQ1 What intervening propositions in the sequence linking up A0 with n are actu-
ally given?
CQ2 What other steps are required to fill in the sequence of events, to make it
plausible?
CQ3 What are the weakest links in the sequence, where specific critical questions
should be asked on whether one event will really lead to another?
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So here we have a cluster of schemes all closely related to each other. The argument
from negative consequences is one of the critical questions matching the basic scheme,
but the scheme for argument from negative consequences is itself based on the closely
related scheme for argument from negative values.
Clarifying the relationships among this cluster of schemes enables us to draw an
important distinction widely discussed in the philosophical literature on practical
reasoning between two distinct types of practical reasoning: instrumental practical
reasoning and value-based practical reasoning. When it comes to classifying the
arguments within this cluster of schemes, it would seem reasonable to venture as
a hypothesis that the basic scheme for practical reasoning is the simplest form of
it, while the scheme for value-based practical reasoning is a more complex variant
of the scheme. It combines the basic scheme with the schemes for argument from
values. On this approach to drawing distinctions within the cluster, arguments from
positive consequences can be taken as species of arguments from positive value,
and arguments from negative consequences can be taken as species of arguments
from negative value. Practical experience in using assistants to use argumentation
schemes to identify types of arguments in natural language text suggests that the
assistants sometimes find it difficult to classify a particular argument identified in a
text as fitting one or more of these schemes. It can be helpful for this purpose is to
give the assistants identification conditions that attempt to formulate key essential
requirements of the type of argument represented by a particular scheme.
The following is a set of three identification conditions for the type of argument
matching the scheme for instrumental practical reasoning: (1) An agent (or group
of agents in the case of multiagent reasoning) is attempting to arrive at a reasoned
decision on what course of action to take in a given set of circumstances requiring
some action, (2) the circumstances provide evidence on which to build pro and
con arguments, arguments for and against the course of action being considered,
(3) the agent is basing its decision on its goals, as well as its perception of the
circumstances of the case, (4) arguments need to be weighed against each other as
stronger or weaker reasons for taking this action or not, and (5) the agent purports
to be using this evaluation of the stronger or weaker reasons as its basis for taking
the action or not. Here the four conditions describe an agent deciding whether to
take a particular course of action or not. But it needs to be recognized that in some
situations there may be several alternative courses of action to be considered, and
the agent is trying to decide which of them would be the best course of action, based
on the reasons provided by its goals and the circumstances of the case.
The identification conditions for the value-based species of practical reasoning
are the same as the five identification conditions for instrumental practical reason-
ing, except that another condition needs to be added: (6) the agent is justifying its
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decision based on its values, as well as on its goals and its perception of the circum-
stances of the case. The aforementioned cluster of arguments is characterized by
several types of relations, which can be of help in distinguishing them and detecting
their possible nets. For example, argument from negative consequences is one of
the questions matching the scheme for argument from practical reasoning. So this
relationship could be described by saying that argument from negative consequences
is a counterargument, a rebuttal or undercutter that can defeat an argument from
practical reasoning in a given case, provided that the negative consequences can be
specified, and provided that it can be shown that these consequences are indeed
negative.
Already from these remarks one relationship emerges. Argument from negative
consequences is based on argument from values, and is a species of argument from
values. Another relationship already shown above, is that value-based practical
reasoning is a more complex form of argument than instrumental practical reasoning.
Value-based practical reasoning is a species of instrumental practical reasoning with
argument from values added on to it.
Another relationship that emerges is that the slippery slope type of argument
is clearly a subtype and special instance of argument from negative consequences.
It is less evident that the slippery slope argument is also a species of value-based
practical reasoning. However, it can be seen that it is. In the case of the slippery
slope argument, the agent doing the decision-making must be assumed to have some
goals and values in mind that the other party, the agent attacking its argument,
can appeal to when mounting a slippery slope argument. Let’s call the two parties
the agent and critic. The slippery slope type of argument is inherently negative.
The critic is using the argument to warn the agent that if he takes a first step, or
continues a series of steps that he has already started, these steps will lead to a
loss of control that cannot be anticipated in advance so that the sequence of actions
will ultimately result in a catastrophic outcome. The critic has to assume that the
agent has some values that both of them share, so that they can both agree that the
outcome warned of by the critic is catastrophic, that is highly negative and worth
avoiding. The critic has to assume that the agent has some goals and is acting in a
rational manner so that it is trying to either achieve or at least be consistent with
these goals as it carries out an action supposedly designed to fulfill them. Otherwise
the critic’s argument is not going to have much force and will be unlikely to deter
the agent from moving ahead.
What especially distinguishes the slippery slope as a distinctive type of argument
are three premises, the recursive premise, the grey zone premise and the loss of
control premise. Given these observations, we can see how the value-based practical
reasoning argument is embedded into the basic slippery slope argument and is a part
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of it. As shown in Figure 8, the basic slippery slope type of argument, represented by
the scheme formulated above, is at the center of a cluster of other related schemes.
Figure 8: Cluster of Schemes
The basic slippery slope argument is derived from value-based practical rea-
soning as its core argument structure, where value-based practical reasoning is a
combination of instrumental practical reasoning and argument from values. So here
it is shown how these schemes are structured together into a cluster. It is also
shown that the basic slippery slope argument is a species of argument from negative
consequences, as scheme that is in turn built partly from the scheme for argument
from values. So these five schemes form a cluster. But the basic slippery slope argu-
ment also has several subtypes, including the precedent slippery slope argument, the
causal slippery slope argument, and the variety of slippery slope argument deriving
from vagueness of a verbal criterion. According to the analysis of the slippery slope
argument given in [Walton, 1992] these four species of the slippery slope argument
are subtypes of a more general form of argument called the all-in slippery slope
argument.
Here we put forward the hypothesis that there is a basic, minimal type of slip-
pery slope argument from which these other more specialized variants are derived.
To indicate the existence of such connections in Figure 8, we have inserted the name
of the scheme for the precedent slippery slope argument underneath the schemes
for argument from precedent and the basic slippery slope argument. This classifica-
tion indicates another aspect of the cluster of schemes surrounding the category of
slippery slope arguments.
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7 Using argumentation schemes: Nets of Argumenta-
tion Schemes
Argumentation schemes are imperfect bridges between the logical (or quasi-logical)
level and the conceptual one [Macagno and Walton, 2015; Macagno, 2015]. From
a conceptual (material) point of view, schemes usually represent an inferential step
from a specific type of premise to a specific type of conclusion. However, there is
a crucial gap between the complexity of natural argumentation, characterized by
several conceptual passages leading to a conclusion, and the schemes. In order to
reason from consequences, we need to classify a state of affairs, evaluate it positively
or negatively, and then suggest a suitable course of action, which can lead to further
reasoning steps, for example from commitment. A single argumentation scheme
cannot capture the complexity of such real argumentation. For this reason, we need
to conceive the relationship between arguments and schemes in a modular way, in
terms of nets of schemes.
A real argument can be described through interconnected and interdependent
argumentation schemes, each of them bringing to light a single argumentative step
that can be explicit, presupposed, or simply implied. In order to explain the idea of
nets of schemes, we consider the following example taken from the debates during
the conflict between Russia and Ukraine in 2014. In this case, the British Foreign
secretary William Hague commented on Russia’s intervention in Crimea and Ukraine
as follows4:
Example 7.1 (The Hague Speech). Be in no doubt, there will be consequences. The
world cannot say it is OK to violate the sovereignty of other nations. This clearly
is a violation of the sovereignty independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine. If
Russia continues on this course we have to be clear this is not an acceptable way to
conduct international relations.
This example is apparently an easy case of argument from consequences, in which
Russia’s continuation of its military operations is depicted by the British Foreign
Secretary as leading to undesirable consequences. However, this reasoning involves
also a classification of Russia’s behavior as a“violation of the sovereignty indepen-
dence and territorial integrity of Ukraine,” and a qualification of this behavior as
unacceptable by the UK and the “world.” By pointing out the shared values to
which the world countries are committed (the sovereignty of other nations cannot
be violated), the speaker makes explicit the commitment against Russia’s behav-
4Ukraine crisis: William Hague warns Russia of economic fallout. The Guardian, 3 March 2014.
Retrieved from: https://is.gd/Kw8Vax. (Accessed on 15 May 2017)
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ior, which is represented by the vague notion of “consequences.” We represent this
structure in Figure 9.
Be in no doubt, there 
will be consequences. 
Russia violated the 
sovereignty of Ukraine. 
Argument from 
Commitment 
This clearly is a violation of the 
sovereignty independence and 
territorial integrity of Ukraine.
Argument from 
Verbal Classification 
If Russia continues on this 
course we have to be clear this is 
not an acceptable way to 
conduct international relations.
The world cannot say it is 
OK to violate the 
sovereignty of other nations. 
Russia intervened 
militarily in Crimea 
and annexed it. 
A hostile military intervention 
in another country is a 
violation of its sovereignty.
Consequences against Russia 
brought about by the UK and the 
world are undesirable for Russia.
Undesirable consequences 
should be avoided.




Figure 9: Net of arguments in the Hague Example
In Figure 9 the dotted boxes represent the tacit premises and the tacit ultimate
conclusion, which are taken for granted by the speaker but are needed for recon-
structing his reasoning. The classification, the reasoning from commitment, and the
argument from consequences are deeply interconnected. The alleged world’s com-
mitment to consequences against Russia depends on the classification of the state
of affairs [Macagno and Walton, 2014; Walton and Macagno, 2009], which fits into
the value of “protecting nations’ sovereignty.” This commitment leads to an implicit
threat, namely a consequence that is presupposed to be negatively evaluated by
Russia.
This analysis can be applied to the structure of a slippery slope argument, such
as the one advanced by the Russian defense analysts in reply to the help provided
by the United States to Ukraine (which includes weapons and hardware)5:
Example 7.2 (The Global Escalation). U.S. provision of military aid to Ukraine
would be seen by Moscow as a declaration of war and spark a global escalation of
Ukraine’s separatist conflict, Russian defense analysts said.
This argument stems from a classification (US provision of military help is a
declaration of war), and leads to a chain of negative consequences (global escalation)
5Russia Would See U.S. Moves to Arm Ukraine as Declaration of War. The Moscow Times, 9
February 2015. Retrieved from: https://is.gd/hxO6MW (Accessed on 15 May 2017)
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that ultimately are going to affect the Western countries. Also in this case, the
central argument (the slippery slope) is associated with other arguments (argument
from classification and from values), resulting in the net shown in the graph in Figure
10.
Moscow will react and there will 
be a global escalation 
of Ukraine's separatist conflict
Slippery Slope
U.S. provision of military aid 
to Ukraine would be seen 
by Moscow as a declaration of war.
Argument from 
Verbal Classification 
A declaration of war is 
unacceptable by Russia.
Russia is going not to accept 
a tacit declaration of war.
The U.S. intend to 
provide military aid.
Russia is going to consider 
U.S. military aid as a 
declaration of war.
An escalation will 
affect also the U.S. and 
the Western countries.
Military actions affecting 
other countries are 
dangerous. 
The escalation is dangerous 




Figure 10: Net of arguments in the global escalation example
In this case, the classification justifies the slippery slope, whose force partially
depends on the fact that the escalation is claimed to be global, affecting also other
countries. The evaluation of this consequence therefore combines with the chain of
events claimed by the analysts, and leads to the practical conclusion of avoiding the
provision of military aid.
A special feature of this example is its compressed style of presentation. Slippery
slope is a complex form of argument built around a connected sequence of actions and
consequences starting from an initial action or policy and then proceeding through
a sequence to an eventual outcome. However in many examples, the intervening
sequence is left implicit, concealing a chain of intervening propositions that have to
be filled in as implicit assumptions of the argument. These implicit assumptions
are needed to make it fit the scheme for the slippery slope type of argument. The
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example really is a slippery slope argument, but in order to prove that it is, sev-
eral implicit premises or conclusions have to be filled in that are essential. These
intervening links are basically filled in by common knowledge concerning the normal
way we expect military inventions to take place and to have consequences. By using
an argument map that reveals the network of argumentation into which the given
slippery slope argument fits, the puzzle of unraveling the network of argumentation
using a cluster can be solved in any given case of argument interpretation.
On the perspective presented in this section, we notice that argumentation
schemes appear in nets instead of in clear and independent occurrences. A scheme
can capture only one passage of reasoning, while the nets can map a more complex
argumentative strategy, involving distinct and interdependent steps.
8 Using Argumentation Schemes in AI and law
In the sections above we have shown how argumentation schemes have been devel-
oped theoretically, providing a system of classification and representation thereof.
One of the most important areas of application of the schemes is computing, and
in particular artificial intelligence. In this section, we will show very briefly how
argumentation schemes have been used in AI and AI and Law, and in particular the
principles guiding the formalization thereof. It is far from a complete survey, but
merely attempts to show how schemes are currently being applied and modeled. It
also tries to convey very briefly how schemes have evolved as they have been used
for different purposes in different AI systems and areas. The discussion includes
the problem of how to model critical questions matching each scheme, and how
schemes are being used in AI and Law in argument mining, case-based reasoning
and statutory interpretation.
The paper that introduced argumentation schemes to the AI and law commu-
nity was [Verheij, 2003b]. This paper proposed the use of argumentation schemes,
as a main tool for analysis in AI and law, stating [Verheij, 2003b, p.168] that the
argumentation scheme is “a concept borrowed from the field of argumentation the-
ory.” Verheij investigated how argumentation schemes could be formalized for use
in computational settings. He proposed [Verheij, 2003b, p.176] that any argumen-
tation scheme can be expressed in the following format: Premise 1, Premise 2,. . . ,
Premise n, therefore Conclusion. Verheij visually represented the graph structure
of an argumentation scheme by building an argument mapping software tool called
ArguMed.
A formal analysis of argumentation schemes of Reed and Walton [Reed and
Walton, 2005] defined a set of attributes, T, associated with propositions by a typing
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relation that associates every proposition to a set of attributes called a type. On this
analysis a scheme is comprised of a set of tuples <SName, SConclusion, SPremises>
where SName is some arbitrary token [Reed and Walton, 2005, p.179]. The gist of
the analysis is that a particular scheme is given a unique name which is associated
with a conclusion type and a set of premise types. An instantiation of a scheme of
a type represented by a unique name must have a conclusion of the right type, and
each premise must also be of the right type.
Prakken [Prakken, 2005, p.34] remarked that schemes act very much like the rules
used in rule-based computer systems. The problem was that AI systems, as well as
argument mapping tools of the kind used in argumentation theory, including the
software systems developed in AI to assist with the building of argument diagrams,
use a model of argument where the premises and conclusions are propositions. Along
these lines, the structure is basically a graph with arcs joining the various points
representing the propositions that can be identified as premises or conclusions. So
far then it seemed that schemes were amenable to being fitted into AI systems
without undue difficulty, but the central problem posed at that point was how to
model the distinctive set of critical questions matching each scheme. One proposal,
commented on below, is to model the critical questions as additional premises of an
argument fitting a scheme.
But there was a big problem with this way of proceeding because different critical
questions act in different ways in this regard. Sometimes merely asking a critical
question is enough to defeat the target argument, whereas in other instances the
asking of the question does not defeat the target argument unless some evidence is
offered. The issue turned out to be one of burden of proof [Gordon et al., 2007].
In some instances, merely asking a critical question is enough to shift the burden
of proof onto the proponent who put forward the argument. In other instances,
the burden of proof does not shift unless the questioner can provide some backup
evidence to support the question.
Verheij [Verheij, 2003b] noted that there were variations on how the critical ques-
tions work in this regard. He noted that critical questions that point to exceptions
to a general rule only undercut an argument while others could be seen refuting the
argument in one of two different ways. One way is to deny an implicit assumption
on which the argument depends. Another is to point to counter-arguments that can
be used to attack the given argument. Verheij [Verheij, 2003b, p.180] showed that
critical questions can perform four distinctively different kinds of roles:
1. They can be used to question whether a premise of a scheme holds.
2. They can point to exceptional situations in which a scheme defaults.
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3. They can frame conditions for the proper use of a scheme.
4. They can indicate other arguments that might be used to attack the scheme.
It is currently widely assumed in AI that there are three ways you can attack an
argument. You can attack one or more of the premises (premise attack), you can
attack the conclusion (conclusion attack), or you can attack the inferential link
joining the premises to the conclusion (for example by arguing that an exception
applies). The last mode of attack is called undercutting [Pollock, 1995]. The first role
would be that of a premise attack. The second and third roles would be undercutting
attacks. The fourth role might refer to an undercutter but could also perhaps be
taken to refer to a conclusion attack. So here the problem is posed of how to model
critical questions given that critical questions can perform more than one function.
ASPIC+ [Prakken, 2010] is a formal argumentation system that consists of a
logical language L with a binary contrariness relation that operates like negation
along with two kinds of inference rules, strict and defeasible, defined over L. ASPIC+
is based on the abstract argumentation framework (Dung, 1995) which can be defined
as a pair (Args, R), where Args is a set of arguments and a binary relation R on
Args is called the attack relation. The underlying idea of the formalism is that
each argument in a sequence of argumentation forming a directed graph structure
can be defeated by other arguments so that a2 defeats a1, a3 defeats a2, . . . , and
defeats an−1. Arguments in the graph can be labeled as “in” or “out”. An argument
is rejected (out) if it is attacked by any other argument that is in. An argument
is accepted if it is not attacked by any other argument that is “in”. Note that
the notions of argument and argument attack are taken as primitive in an abstract
argumentation system, so that such a system by itself provides no way of modeling
the premises and the conclusion.
In the system developed in [Prakken et al., 2015] for case-based reasoning, pref-
erences among factors are established in the present case, and then these preferences
can be applied to the current case. One of the argumentation schemes (CS1) of can
be used to briefly explain how such schemes are meant to be used in legal arguments
from precedent. In all these schemes, for purposes of presentation, it is assumed
that the arguer is putting forward the current argument (curr) to support the side
of the plaintiff.
commonPfactors(curr; prec) = p,





According to this scheme, the current argument should be decided for the plaintiff
because the common p factors were preferred to the common d factors in the prece-
dent argument. [Prakken et al., 2015] uses a running example to illustrate how an
argument fitting a scheme can be attacked by other arguments in the formal system
representing the argumentation in a legal case.
Argument schemes are being used in AI and Law for argument mining. Moens,
Mochales Palau, Boiy and Reed devised techniques for automatically classifying
arguments in legal texts by using indicators of rhetorical structure expressed by
conjunctions and adverbial groupings [Moens et al., 2007, p.226]. They identify
words, pairs of successive words, sequences of three successive words, adverbs, verbs
and modal auxiliary verbs. This work has been applied to legal argumentative texts
[Mochales Palau and Moens, 2009; Mochales Palau and Moens, 2011]. By classifying
types of arguments using argumentation schemes they built a system for searching
for arguments in legal cases [Mochales Palau and Moens, 2008]. The project used
human annotators supervised by legally trained personnel to identify arguments in
texts of the European Court of Human Rights [Mochales Palau and Ieven, 2009].
Their results suggested that it would help to have additional criteria that can be
applied to judge whether a given argument fits a particular scheme.
Rahwan et al. [Rahwan et al., 2011] carried forward research on the automated
identification of particular schemes by developing an OWL-based ontology of argu-
mentation schemes in description logic that showed how description logic inference
techniques can be used to reason about automatic argument classification. Their
method of identifying schemes has been implemented in a web-based system called
Avicenna [Rahwan et al., 2011, pp. 11–13]. A user can search arguments by using
schemes along with other tools.
Gordon and Walton [Gordon and Walton, 2006] proposed a solution to the prob-
lem of how to model critical questions by using three kinds of premises (ordinary
premises, assumptions and exceptions) in the Carneades Argumentation System
(CAS). This solution used information about the dialectical status of statements
(undisputed, at issue, accepted or rejected) to model critical questions in such a way
as to allow the burden of proof to be allocated to the proponent of the argument or
the critical questioner as appropriate for the case in point. On this way of proceed-
ing, ordinary premises need to be supported by further arguments even if they have
not been questioned. In the case of exceptions, however, the critical questioner is the
one who has to offer evidential support to make his criticism defeat the argument.
Version 4 is the current implemented formal and computational system of CAS,
based on the formal model of argument [Gordon and Walton, 2016] called CAS2.
CAS2 provides support for cumulative arguments, cyclic argument graphs, practical
reasoning, and multi-criteria decision analysis. The source code of all four versions
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can be accessed on the Internet6. Carneades 4 is now online 7. CAS2, as implemented
in version 4 of Carneades, provides a formal model that uses argumentation schemes.
In the CAS2 model [Gordon and Walton, 2016] an argumentation scheme is
defined as a tuple (e, v, g), where e is a function for weighing arguments which
instantiate a scheme, v is a function for validating arguments, to test whether they
properly instantiate an argumentation scheme, and g is a function for generating
arguments by instantiating the scheme. The validation function tells us whether
the argument instantiates a particular scheme, but then, once a set of schemes has
been specified, the system can apply their validation functions to given argument to
whether that scheme is instantiated, or not, by the given argument.
An argument is defined as a tuple (S, P, C, U), where S is the scheme instantiated
by the argument; P , a finite subset of L, is the set of premises of the argument; c,
a member of L, is the conclusion of the argument. U is an undercutter of the
argument [Pollock, 1995]. In version 4 of CAS an issue is defined as a tuple (O, F ),
where O represents the options (called the alternative positions) of the issue, and F
is the proof standard of the issue. Argument graphs in CAS version 4 are tripartite,
rather than bipartite, as in the previous versions, with separate nodes for statements,
arguments and issues. Argument diagrams in version 4 are extended with a new node
type, diamonds, for representing issues. There can be any number of issues you like
in a single diagram. Argument evaluation is carried out by labeling statements
in, out or undecided. A statement is in if and only if it has been assumed to be
acceptable to a rational audience, or has been derived from such assumptions via
the application of the arguments, argument weighing functions and proof standards
used in CAS. A statement is out if and only if it is neither assumed nor supported
by arguments and would therefore be rejected by a rational audience. A statement
is undecided if it is neither in nor out.
Carneades 3 uses backwards-chaining, in a goal-directed way, whereas Carneades
4 uses forwards-reasoning to derive arguments from argumentation schemes and
assumptions. Both strategies, forwards and backwards reasoning, have their ad-
vantages. Forwards reasoning allows CAS to invent arguments using argumentation
schemes, such as the scheme for argument from expert opinion, where the conclusion
is a second-order variable ranging over propositions. Only Carneades 4 can construct
arguments using formalizations of all of the twenty or so schemes currently built into
the system.
Case-based reasoning (CBR) is vitally important for AI and Law and for un-




by comparing and contrasting its features to those of prior cases that have already
been evaluated [Aleven, 1997]. These prior cases are stored in a knowledge base
which supplies similar precedent cases that can be pro or con the evaluation being
considered in the given case. In some systems widely known in AI and law [Ashley,
1990], judgments of similarity between a pair of cases are decided by the factors that
they share. Special argumentation schemes have been built to model arguments
from precedent using factors in case-based reasoning [Gordon and Walton, 2009;
Wyner and Bench-Capon, 2007; Wyner et al., 2011]. Prakken et al. [Prakken et al.,
2015] offered a formal version of these legal case-based argumentation schemes using
ASPIC+.
Walton, Sartor and Macagno [Walton et al., 2016] showed how canons of inter-
pretation can be translated into argumentation schemes. This project was carried
out by by analyzing the most common types of statutory arguments found in legal
examples and certain key forms of interpretive legal argumentation found in the work
of Tarello [Tarello, 1980] and McCormick and Summers [MacCormick and Summers,
1991]. Steps were carries out to show how these legally recognizable forms of argu-
ment can be formulated as argumentation schemes. Among the schemes modeled
are argument from ordinary meaning, argument from technical meaning, argument
from precedent, argument from purpose, a contrario argument, historical argument
and the non-redundancy argument. It was shown using classical examples of statu-
tory interpretation in law how these schemes (and others) can be incorporated into
computational argumentation systems such as CAS and APSIC+ and applied to
displaying the pro-contra structure argumentation in legal cases using argument
mapping tools.
In the following sections we will illustrate shortly two other computational appli-
cations of argumentation schemes, namely their role in argument mining and formal
ontologies.
9 Using Schemes for Argument Mining
Argumentation schemes also have an important role to play in a major new area of
computational research into argumentation: argument mining. Argument mining
focuses on the development of algorithms and techniques for the automatic extrac-
tion of argument structure from natural language text. Though it has connections
to areas such as sentiment analysis and opinion mining, it represents a substan-
tially more demanding task. There are two features that make argument mining
so difficult. The first concerns the availability of data and the second, the limits of
statistical approaches to language understanding.
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Many approaches to mining syntactic and semantic structure from unrestricted
natural language have, since the late 1990s, been based heavily in statistical analysis:
essentially, modelling the regularities in language by examining and comparing many,
many different examples. The most robust syntactic parsers, for example, are based
not on theoretical linguistic analysis — which proved on the whole to be too limited
and too brittle — but on statistical models based on corpora typically comprising
millions of examples [Koehn et al., 2003]. Though the machine learning mechanisms
upon which such techniques depend vary, one feature that they share is the need
for such large datasets from which to draw regularities. If, therefore, argument
mining is to be able to deploy the same techniques, it requires large datasets, and
datasets not just of argumentation per se, by argumentation that has been analysed
for its structure. As anyone involved in the teaching of critical thinking skills will
attest, such analysis of argument structure is both demanding and extremely time
consuming. Until very recently there were few datasets, and those that did exist
were available in idiosyncratic representation languages, with little re-use between
research teams and projects — so what effort was invested in data collection and
analysis was regularly lost. Two approaches have started to change this.
First, there have been attempts to collect datasets specifically for community
use. The first example is the Internet Argument Corpus, IAC [Walker et al., 2012],
which collects 390,000 examples. The problem facing the IAC is that it is designed
primarily from a text-processing viewpoint, with little argumentation theory sit-
ting behind it. As a result, the conception of argument that it embodies is very
thin and more or less unrecognisable to researchers from argumentation theory and
computational models of argument, viz., quote-response pairs with associated po-
larity (additional features including sarcasm and nastiness are marked for subsets).
A second example is more directly rooted in informed models of argumentation.
The Potsdam Microtext Corpus [Peldszus and Stede, 2016] provides artificially con-
strained — but completely human-generated, natural language — arguments that
are structured according to the work of Freeman [Freeman, 1991] with explicit dis-
tinction between, for example, linked and convergent arguments, undercutting and
rebutting attacks and so on. Another unique advantage of the Microtext Corpus is
that it has been professionally translated so that both English and German versions
exist: to our knowledge this is the first parallel corpus of argumentation. On the
other hand, the fact that every argument is required to contain a total of five compo-
nents (premises and conclusions), whilst providing a vitally useful “laboratory” for
testing techniques, risks placing a severe limitation on the subsequent generalizabil-
ity of those techniques to unrestricted arguments in the wild. The limited size of the
corpus — just 130 examples — also places limitations on what can be accomplished
using traditional statistical machine learning techniques.
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The second approach has been to provide infrastructure specifically for collecting,
publishing, sharing and re-using corpora. Whilst there are now several platforms
for online analysis of argument (argunet8, debategraph9, AGORA-net10, Rationale-
Online11, etc.) none provide open access to the data in machine processable ways,
except, as far as we are aware, for the infrastructure offered by the Argument Web
[Rahwan et al., 2011; Bex et al., 2013]. The Argument Web is a vision for an inter-
connected web of arguments and debates, regardless of the software used to create
them, analyse them or extract them, and regardless, too, of the uses — academic,
social or commercial — to which they might be put. The vision supports, for ex-
ample, the academic analysis of an argument presented in a political broadcast; the
automated analysis of responses to it on social media; the deployment of automated
dialogue games for online users to interact with both original and responses; the
automated summary of the status of the debate to a government policy department;
and the delivery of a corpus comprising the debate to researchers in argument min-
ing. Argumentation schemes in the style of [Walton et al., 2008] form a cornerstone
of the Argument Web, as a way of providing a rich ontology of reasoning forms.
Further details of this ontology occur in the next section; here we focus on the tools
and the ways in which they can be used to develop corpora.
Though the first publicly available corpus of argumentation was developed using
Araucaria (viz. AraucariaDB, see [Reed and Walton, 2005]), the software itself is
now very old and virtually obsolete. Though it remains the only software to handle
large analyses, such as the ones developed by Wigmore for mapping cases, and the
only to interchange between Wigmore, Toulmin and Freeman styles of analysis, it
has been superseded in its core functionality by the Online Visualisation of Argu-
ment tool, OVA [Janier et al., 2014]. OVA provides a simple-to-use interface for
analysing existing argumentation in both monologue and, in the extended OVA+,
also dialogue. It supports enthymeme reconstruction; argumentation scheme analy-
sis; critical question processing; serial, linked, convergent and divergent structures;
undercutting, rebutting and undermining attacks; and in OVA+, locution analy-
sis; dialogue game rule analysis; illocutionary force identification; the role of ethos
[Duthie et al., 2016] and personal attacks; and ultimately, full Inference Anchoring
Theory analysis [Budzysnka and Reed, 2011]. Analyses from OVA can be stored
in AIFdb, a database infrastructure fabric for storing and accessing argument data
[Lawrence et al., 2012].
8Retrieved from: http://www.argunet.org/ (Accessed on 10 May 2016)
9Retrieved from: http://debategraph.org/Stream.aspx?nid=61932&vt=ngraph& dc=focus (Ac-
cessed on 10 May 2016)
10http://agora.gatech.edu/ (Accessed on 10 May 2016)
11https://www.rationaleonline.com/ (Accessed on 10 May 2016)
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One side effect of using AIFdb is that the data is easily transportable to other
forms, both representational (in being able to convert to formats required for
Carneades [Walton and Gordon, 2012] and Rationale [van Gelder, 2007], for exam-
ple), and processable — in being able to convert via ASPIC+ [Modgil and Prakken,
2013] to abstract frameworks [Dung, 1995] via formal equivalences established in
[Bex et al., 2013]. More importantly for our current purposes, sets of analyses in
AIFdb can be configured to constitute a corpus using the AIFdb corpus management
tools [Lawrence and Reed, 2015] available online at corpora.aifdb.org, and AIFdb
current constitutes the largest publicly available dataset of analysed argumenta-
tion. These tools enable research teams to define corpora comprising both analysed
argumentation and raw text; both argumentative and non-argumentative source ma-
terial; both raw data and metadata. Corpora themselves are aggregable providing
flexible structuring options to manage dependencies between teams, projects, and
objectives. The original AraucariaDB corpus is available on this infrastructure, but
so too are smaller datasets focusing specifically on argumentation schemes, such as
the Argument Schemes in the Moral Maze, comprising excerpts from the BBC Moral
Maze radio programme that involve 35 instances of argumentation schemes and the
ExpertOpinion-PositiveConsequences corpus comprising 71 examples of just these
two schemes.
With the availability of appropriate datasets becoming less of an impediment,
various approaches to automatically recognising argument structure have been de-
veloped. The majority have been focused specifically on statistical models, which
brings us to the second major challenge facing argument mining: the limits of such
models. Whilst it is certainly the case that statistical approaches are starting to de-
liver results for argument mining, and will undoubtedly continue to do so, it is also
the case that the more sophisticated conceptions of argument developed in argumen-
tation theory remain extraordinarily demanding. The reason for this lies precisely in
their sophistication. With so many patterns of argumentation, so many structures,
so many ways in which components can be left implicit, so many types of reasoning,
the amount of data required to train statistical models becomes not just unwieldy
but unreasonable and, quite probably, unattainable.
Consider a comparison with syntactic analysis, where statistical models have
been so successful. The number of rules governing how different parts of speech can
be legally combined run in theoretical linguistics to tens of examples. In statistical
models, it is hundreds (which is why they are so successful). The number of rules
governing how argument components can be assembled (and left implicit) runs, by
combination across argumentation schemes, to thousands or more. So whilst we
might expect statistically oriented techniques to deliver us good results on simple
and strongly generalizable aspects of argument recognition, for the type of analysis
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that is typically taught to students of critical thinking classes, more is required. It is
looking increasingly likely that having strong, well defined conceptions of argument,
dialogue and argument schemes provide exactly the sort of additional information
required to guide machine learning processes by acting, in essence, as priors to that
process: defining expectations about what is likely to be seen. This combination
of statistical and structural approaches is looking very promising. In particular, we
provide examples here that tap in specifically to structure provided by argument
schemes.
Feng and Hirst [Wei Feng and Hirst, 2011] aimed to classify arguments into the
type of scheme employed. Like some of the earliest work in argument mining, such
as [Moens and Mochales Palau, 2007], they also used the AraucariaDB corpus as a
starting point, because it was the only dataset at that time with annotated examples
of argumentation schemes. They used the 65 argumentation schemes from [Walton
et al., 2008], but emphasized the importance of the five schemes they found to be
the most commonly used ones in their corpus: argument from example, argument
from cause to effect, practical reasoning, argument from consequences and argument
from verbal classification [Wei Feng and Hirst, 2011]. The number of occurrences
of these most common five schemes constituted 61% of the kinds of arguments
identified in their database [Wei Feng and Hirst, 2011, p.998]. They used a variety
of features with which to train the machine learning classifiers including key words
and phrases as textual indicators of argumentation schemes. They identified, for
example, twenty-eight keywords and phrases associated with the scheme for practical
reasoning, including “want”, “aim”, “objective”, and modal verbs like “should”,
“must” and “need” [Wei Feng and Hirst, 2011, p.991]. Their results were extremely
promising, providing classification accuracies ranging from 0.64 to 0.98.
Building on this approach, Lawrence and Reed ([Lawrence and Reed, 2015] ex-
tended the model to use argumentation schemes not just as a target for machine
learning but to aid the very process of identifying argumentative structure (rather
than presupposing it as input, as in Feng and Hirst). The intuition is that argu-
mentation schemes do not connect propositions that are all alike, but rather are
associated with particular types of propositions. In this way, arguments from pos-
itive consequence will typically conclude with a normative statement in the sub-
junctive mood; arguments from expert opinion will typically have a premise which
reports, either directly or indirectly, the speech of another; arguments from analogy
will include a premise which attributes some property to some individual; and so
on. If it is possible to identify instances of some of these types, it will constrain
the potential argument structures that can be reassembled. If, for example, an au-
tomatic algorithm can spot the lexeme said, there is a reasonable chance that we
have reported speech, which in turn increases the chance that it is part of an expert
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opinion argument. If we can find the lexeme expert in a sentence close by, we can
be even more sure we have argument from expert opinion and can start looking
nearby for a conclusion — and that conclusion is likely to be a sentence which has
strong semantic similarity with the clause that follows “said”. In this way, knowing
a priori about argumentation scheme structure helps to constrain the problem of
automatically recognising the argument structure. It turns out that this hypothesis
is borne out by results.
Lawrence and Reed report (ibid.) results ranging from an F1 performance of
0.59 to 0.91 for detecting scheme components and of 0.62 to 0.88 for identifying
scheme instances. Operationalising argumentation scheme structure in this way de-
pends, however, upon “knowledge engineering”, or, more specifically, “ontology en-
gineering” — the construction of explicit computational models that capture scheme
structure and the commonalities, similarities and classificatory relationships between
schemes. It is to this question that we turn next.
10 Schemes in Formal Ontologies
The Argument Interchange Format, AIF, is not just a representation language for
argument structure; it also has a formal definition rooted in description logic; that
is to say, it provides a core ontology for describing argument (though that core is
rather compact, it admits of extension using “adjunct ontologies” that extend it to
handle features such as dialogical interaction, user- and social-oriented features, and
so on). The AIF was laid out initially in [Chesñevar et al., 2006] and extended in its
description logic specification in [Rahwan et al., 2007]. Given this basis, it is then
rather straightforward to extend it to further specify not just that two propositions
might be linked by an application of a rule of inference (or “RA”), but to also specify
the different types of such rules of inference, that is to define an ontology of argu-
mentation schemes. This ontology not only describes the structure of argumentation
schemes in machine-processable form, but also defines relationships between schemes
(such as generalisation-specification relationships) and relationships between scheme
components (such as that knowledge assertions occur as premises in several differ-
ent schemes). By way of example, snippets of the ontology concerned with the
argumentation scheme from expert opinion are shown in Figure 11 below.
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Figure 11: Snippet of Argumentation Scheme Ontology
In the first stanza, the conclusion and premises concerning the knowledge asser-
tion (that the expert said something) and the field expertise (that the speaker is
indeed an expert) are set up. In the second stanza, the remaining premises (those
captured as presumptions and exceptions) are added in, covering credibility, backup
evidence, consistency between experts and expert reliability. The third stanza shows
how one of these, consistency between experts, can be used to drive a stereotypi-
cal way of attacking this inference — i.e. the posing of a critical question (see
[Reed and Walton, 2005] for the mechanics of operationalizing critical questions in
this way). The aim here is just to give a flavour of how all the important com-
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ponents of argumentation schemes — structure, description and critical questions
— can be captured in a formal ontology. The full ontology is available online at
http://arg.tech/aif.owl, and is used by many of the Argument Web online services.
Two benefits of this approach are demonstrated in [Rahwan et al., 2011]. The
first is an economy in specification, that allows more specific schemes to be defined
in terms of minor additions to more general ones. The second, much more im-
portantly, is that these structures support automated reasoning, in three distinct
ways. First, it becomes possible to reason across argument structures, identifying,
for example, transitivity of inferences, so that if X is used to infer Y , and Y to
infer Z, the dependence of X on Z can be inferred automatically. Of course such
reasoning is not at all unique to ontologically based systems, but is a convenient
side benefit. An ontologically more interesting way of performing automated rea-
soning is to perform automatic classification. This is where formal ontologies, and
the reasoning systems constructed on top of them, excel. Rahwan et al., exemplify
this technique by showing how fear appeal arguments are naturally classifiable as a
subset of negative consequence arguments. The third and final way of performing
automated reasoning is also of use in designing and implementing dialogue systems.
By virtue of hierarchical relationships between schemes that are represented in, or
inferable from, the ontology, it also becomes possible to infer appropriate critical
questions that might be asked of a given argument. Thus, for example, all of the
critical questions of a superclass can be asked of an instance of a sub-class of argu-
mentation schemes. In these ways, formal representation of argumentation schemes
in an explicit ontology can contribute to the computational techniques for analysing,
processing and interacting with arguments.
11 Conclusions
Argumentation schemes represent the abstract structures of the most common and
stereotypical arguments used in everyday conversation and specific fields, such as
law, science and politics. They appear as a set of premises having an abstract form
with variables and constants, leading to an abstract conclusion. They are abstract
in the sense that they provide a form for structuring inferential relation between
the premises and the conclusion. Some schemes are based on the most abstract
relations (classification, cause, authority), while others specify the most abstract
premises including some further detail (negative consequences; expert opinion ad
populum argument) [Walton et al., 2008].
The abstract nature of the schemes allows the analyst to detect the structure
of natural arguments, and recognize patterns occurring in everyday reasoning. This
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paper has shown how they can be applied to real arguments in natural language
discourse, and in technical discourse as well, for that matter. In this paper, it has
been shown how these schemes, at their current state of development can be used
as tools to identify kinds of arguments in a text, and beyond that how they can
be an important part of argument evaluation. Throughout the history of logic and
rhetoric there has always been some uncertainty about the role of the topics [Bird,
1962]. Some have seen them as forms of logical inference that can be used to show
that arguments are valid, where the term “valid” is used in a wider sense that can
include not only deductively valid arguments but also defeasible arguments that
have an identifiable structure as fitting a particular topic. Others have seen the
topics of as having a search function that can be used to find arguments to prove
a designated conclusion. The search function is supposed to help an arguer select
arguments that have premises accepted by the audience to whom the argument is
directed [Kienpointner and Kindt, 1997].
Schemes can also be used for argument construction. As we saw in this paper,
an argumentation scheme is taken to have a warranting function that enables an
inference to be drawn from a set of premises to a conclusion. This practical way of
justifying schemes indicates their usefulness not only for argument evaluation, but
also for argument construction, also called argument invention in the long history of
the subject tracing back to the Sophists and Aristotle. An argument invention device
would enable an arguer to search for an argument that could be used to support a
claim s/he wants to prove [Kienpointner, 1987]. When viewed in this way, topics
can be seen to have a use as components of an argument construction function, for
use in a system for finding arguments. The schemes can be used as instruments for
producing arguments, allowing the user to decide the type of argument he considers
the most applicable to his purpose, and then develop a specific line of reasoning
from the premises or evidential facts he has to the conclusion he needs to prove. In
this guise, the schemes are dialectical instruments for use in the task of argument
construction.
The advent of IBM’s new Watson Debater tool [Aharoni et al., 2014] is a leap
forward for argument invention because it enables a user to quickly search through
a database such as Wikpedia and find useful pro and con arguments supporting or
attacking a designated claim. Once this tool comes onto the market, it will greatly
stimulate research on argument invention in argumentation studies. The Debater
tool does not (so far) use argumentation schemes, but there is a formal and com-
putational argumentation system, the Carneades Argumentation System (CAS)12.
By inputting information into the CAS find arguments assistant, a user who has a
12https://carneades.github.io/ (Accessed on 10 May 2016)
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database containing propositions recording the commitments of the audience, the
automated assistant constructs a chain of argumentation where the conclusion of the
chain is the proposition is the goal proposition that the speaker wants to persuade
the audience to accept, called the arguer’s ultimate claim, or ultimate probandum,
the proposition to be proved, in the language of the ancient stasis theory [Walton
and Gordon, 2012]. The argument assistant searches through the commitments of
the audience and uses a repository of argumentation schemes in its knowledge base
to collect a set of arguments moving from these premises to the ultimate claim. If
there are such arguments available the assistant gives that information, but may
suggest a partial way forward.
Argumentation schemes are instruments that can be used in different ways to
many disciplines addressing the analysis of discourse in general, and reasoned dis-
course in particular. The current research on schemes can improve noticeably the
field of application and make this tool crucial for a deeper analysis of argumenta-
tive exchanges. To this purpose, argumentation schemes need first to be integrated
within a theory of discourse interpretation. Schemes can be powerful instruments
for representing arguments and relations between sentences. However, at present
they presuppose an interpretation of discourse. This line of research could show
how schemes can represent interpretation, and how they can be used to assess what
interpretation is the best one [Macagno, 2012]. A second challenge in this area is to
link the theory of dialogue types and discourse moves (utterances) to argumentation
schemes [Macagno and Bigi, 2017]. By showing how certain schemes are the most
adequate to pursue specific dialogical ends, it is possible to map not only a set of
useful tools for argument production, but also a set of presumptions for interpreting
and classifying arguments based on the type of dialogue.
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